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Pay-for-Performance
Reimbursement in Health Care:
Chasing Cost Control and
Increased Quality through
“New and Improved”
Payment Incentives
Rick Mayes and Jessica Walradt

Abstract
Pay-for-performance (P4P) reimbursement has become
a popular and growing form of health care payment
built on the belief that payment incentives strongly
affect medical providers’ behavior. By paying more to
those providers who are deemed to deliver better care,
the goal is to increase quality and, hopefully, restrain
cost growth. This article provides a brief explanation
of: (1) how previous P4P plans in the U.S. have fared,
along with their special relationship to primary care,
and (2) how England’s experience with P4P and newer
versions of these kinds of plans being pursued in places
such as Massachusetts might provide valuable case
studies for how the U.S. and other countries can achieve
meaningful reform of health care organization, delivery
and finance.

Background, Performance of Early Plans,
and Primary Care
P4P financially rewards medical providers who achieve,
improve upon or exceed performance goals on specified
quality benchmarks. It has developed largely in response
to the cost control problems and perverse incentives

associated with fee-for-service reimbursement, which
is the dominant model in the U.S.1 Instead of simply
reimbursing providers more for greater volume and
intensity of care, P4P pays more to providers whose care
is deemed to be of higher (or sufficiently high) quality.2
These plans are intended to lower health care costs over
the long term by increasing preventative care, primary
care and the improved treatment of conditions at earlier
stages of development.3 Most P4P approaches adjust
payments to hospitals, individual physicians, networks
of physicians or medical practice groups in one of three
ways: (1) a bonus payment based on a percentage of
all care delivered by a provider, (2) a bonus payment
per patient member for a provider that has delivered
what pre-determined measures would deem as “high
quality” care, or (3) as a percentage of the total cost
savings achieved relative to what costs would have been
without achieving higher quality.4
The first generation of P4P plans that proliferated
from the early to mid-2000s in the U.S. proved mostly
ineffective in either increasing quality or controlling
costs.5 The bonus payments were arguably too small and
the areas of clinical quality too narrow to foster significant
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behavioral change on the part of providers.6 Moreover,
complex patients with multiple medical problems posed
unique dilemmas for physicians when their complicated
conditions did not fit neatly within individual care
guidelines,7 and their care was (often minimally)
coordinated among different clinicians.8 Concerns
emerged that “the methods used to measure the quality
of care unfairly penalized providers caring for patients
with multiple chronic conditions.”9 Studies found that
some P4P plans did actually worsen existing disparities
by discouraging physicians from caring for poorer, less

The reality in health care is that
there are no fundamentally
“new” methods of health care
payment. Ultimately, P4P and
other alternative approaches are
newly blended combinations of old
models – fee-for-service, salary,
and capitation – each of which has
its own strengths and weaknesses.

compliant patients.10 In short, some providers began
“cherry picking”11 to avoid those potential patients who
they perceived were likely to lower their overall quality
scores.12 One of the most prevalent changes associated
with the early P4P plans was increased documentation.13
In other words, rather than increases in quality and use
of preventive services, early P4P plans generated more
record-keeping. “If pay for performance was a therapy,”
an observer noted in 2007, “its rapid diffusion thus far
would have to be considered premature.”14
One of the areas that P4P supporters have most hoped
would benefit from this new form of payment is primary
care.15 Fee-for-service reimbursement has traditionally
disadvantaged primary care by overpaying for procedures
and intensity of care,16 while underpaying for evaluation
and management services that require physicians
to spend time diagnosing and coordinating patients’
care.17 This underpayment has led many primary care
physicians to feel like “hamsters on a treadmill,” seeing
more and more patients to make up for reimbursements
that do not keep up with their practice expenses.18
Rather than focusing on increased volume (more office
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visits) to remain financially solvent, P4P advocates
have suggested that primary care physicians could earn
more by focusing on increased quality and the resulting
bonus payments they receive.19 Yet the problem that
has emerged with this approach is that the far larger,
underlying payment model that still drives the bulk of
providers’ behavior remains fee-for-service.20 And P4P
does nothing to address the over-supply of unnecessary
medical care.21 In short, P4P (based on quality) and
fee-for-service (based on volume and intensity) do not
naturally or easily complement one another in actual
practice.22

England, Massachusetts, and the
Inability of Payment Reform Alone to
Reform Health Care
England’s experience with P4P and primary care,
therefore, ought to provide an illuminating contrast.23
If the problem of adding quality payment incentives to
physicians’ reimbursement in the U.S. has been that
these payments have generally been too small, too
narrow clinically, and overwhelmed by the incentives
within the dominant fee-for-service model still in place,
then P4P in England should potentially show greater
results. Its primary care physicians are salaried within a
national health system that rewards them with qualitybased bonuses equal to as much as 25-30 per cent of
their total income.24 Introduced in England in 2004
as the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), the
new payment scheme included 136 quality indicators
covering the management of chronic disease, practice
organization, and patients’ care experiences.25 One year
after the QOF’s inception, the rate of improvement in
quality of care for such conditions as asthma and diabetes
increased.26 While the care associated with heart disease
did not initially experience this success, by 2007, “the
rate for all three conditions had slowed, and the quality
of those aspects of care that were not associated with
an incentive had declined for patients with asthma or
heart disease.”27 Continuity of care also declined after
the scheme began operation. Apparently, once quality
targets were reached, “the improvement in the quality
of care for patients with these conditions slowed, and
the quality of care declined for two conditions that had
not been linked to incentives.”28
The reality in health care is that there are no
fundamentally “new” methods of health care payment.29
Ultimately, P4P and other alternative approaches are
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newly blended combinations of old models – fee-forservice, salary, and capitation – each of which has its
own strengths and weaknesses.30 And payment reform
alone cannot correct the deeply fragmented, inefficient
and costly U.S. health care system.31 As Atul Gawande
noted in his influential 2009 New Yorker article, “The
Cost Conundrum,”32 read by President Barack Obama
and shared with his White House staff,33 achieving
high quality, affordable, integrated health care with
an abundance of health promotion and prevention
is invariably achieved by changing the overall culture
of medicine to make it more like organizations such
as the Mayo Clinic, Geisinger Health System, and
Intermountain Healthcare.34 Before this kind of cultural
transformation can occur and costs can be brought
under greater control, however, payment reform is a
good and arguably necessary place to start.35
The U.S. state leading the charge in payment reform by
trying to end fee-for-service medicine is Massachusetts.36
After achieving near-universal coverage with the passage
of ambitious health insurance reforms in 2006, the state
embarked on the subsequent and more challenging
goal of cost control.37 It has no choice.38 Massachusetts
now spends 33 per cent more per person than the U.S.
average and the state’s increasingly expensive universal
health plan has necessitated new taxes and fees to
stabilize its finances.39 A special commission established
to find ways to control cost growth wants to replace feefor-service reimbursement to individual providers with
payments for entire episodes of patient care made to
groups of clinicians (“accountable care organizations,”
or ACOs) who emphasize primary care and would
together take responsibility for a patient’s health.40
Moving to this capitation payment model,41 whereby an
ACO receives a fixed or “capitated” amount of money per
patient member per month – adjusted for the member’s
health status and with built-in bonuses for achieving
higher quality outcomes – would be a dramatic departure
from the status quo.42 It would encourage two behaviors
that fee-for-service tends to discourage: “collaboration
of physicians, hospitals, and other providers involved in
a patient’s care; and active efforts to reduce avoidable
complications of care (and the costs associated with
them).”43 Moreover, “it accomplishes these goals by
paying for all the care a patient needs over the course of
a defined clinical episode or a set period of management
of a chronic condition,” rather than paying for individual
medical services.44

The political stakes for this model of payment reform
are high.45 The landmark Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, signed into U.S. law by President Obama in
March of 2010, established a program for expanding
ACOs by January 2012.46 The hope is to begin moving
the biggest U.S. federal health insurance program,
Medicare, away from fee-for-service reimbursement47
and toward a global payment model that will encourage
more holistic and integrated care,48 especially for its most
expensive patients with multiple chronic conditions.49
As its previous experiments with payment reform
have demonstrated,50 Medicare is the nation’s most
influential payer and, thus, directly and indirectly drives
the behavior of all other stakeholders in U.S. health care
system.51 Where it leads, others inevitably follow.52
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